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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of nuclear weapons on conflict behavior between states.  
Using the Soviet Union and China engaging in conflict with the United States from 1950 
to 1965 as case studies, this paper provides support for the theory that nuclear weapons 
do impact conflict behavior.  It was found that newer nuclear states will rely on bold 
brinkmanship strategies while older nuclear states will rely on deterrence.  Non-nuclear 
states will use avoidance and deterrence when engaging in conflict with a nuclear power. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 Conflict is inevitable and universal.  Whether nuclear weapons affect a state’s 
behavior during conflict may not be so generalized between all states.  I will examine if 
and how nuclear weapons affect conflict behavior between states depending on nuclear 
status.   
The international community is complex and consists of a great number of daily 
interactions between all states.  From allies to trade deals, states must communicate in 
order to sustain themselves, gain strength and power, and protect themselves from 
potential threats.  There is no overarching governing body for the international 
community, such as those that exist within the states, creating a complicated playing field 
for these interactions to occur in.  This anarchic system allows individual states to behave 
in any way that supports their personal power and survival.  Given this freedom, it is 
interesting how most states have appeared to agree to a set of international norms that 
attempt to govern the international community in a non-official fashion. 
 States all have main interests and secondary interests that guide their actions and 
decisions.  The main interests of all states are power and survival.1  A state’s secondary 
interests have to do with the state’s unique identity, leadership, and citizen constituency.  
Power and survival are difficult to quantify but can be seen as a state’s position within the 
international community.  Conflict between states is quite common as the shared goals of 
power and survival often contradict other states’ desire for the same things.  Because of 
 
1 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 55, 
http://archive.org/details/tragedyofgreatpo0000mear. 
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this, conflict, in order to gain more power or survive in the community, occurs often and 
can be handled in many different ways.   
Military intervention and diplomatic negotiations are two possibilities when 
entering into a conflict with an enemy state.  It is important to note that war is not a 
guarantee with military action and peace is not a guarantee if negotiations are pursued.  A 
state’s lesser and more individual interests and values help determine which type of 
intervention strategy will be used to attempt to resolve a conflict.   The type of conflict at 
hand and the other state(s) the conflict is involving also determine which strategies a state 
will use.  When it comes to military intervention with an enemy state, there is still a large 
number of different conflict behaviors that can be pursued to claim victory.  
Understanding a state’s choice of conflict behavior is crucial to determining successful 
strategies to oppose and win against an opponent.        
All decision-making is imperfect, considerably so during a crisis.2  The 
heightened tensions and pressure that a crisis creates leads to mistakes in decision 
making.3  If a state can understand and learn what to potentially expect when opposing an 
enemy state, the decision-making process and conflict itself can become more perfect.  
Understanding an opposing state’s conflict behavior strategies allows other states to make 
better decisions regarding how to handle that state.  This understanding of when and how 
a particular conflict strategy will be used by another state provides a significant 
advantage and the potential for success during the conflict. 
 
2 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface, 1980 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
Univ. Press, 20) 201-203. 
3 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 189. 
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Nuclear weapons were first developed by the United States in July of 1945.4  
Only a month later, the United States used two atomic bombs against Japan in August 
1945, ending World War II in the Pacific Theatre.  These two bombings on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki are the only use of nuclear weapons during conflict in history.  Ever since 
the international community witnessed the devastation in Japan in 1945, these weapons 
have been labeled as weapons of deterrence and not for use.      
All military conflict behaviors involve a large amount of risk for the state and 
require careful consideration, especially when nuclear weapons are involved.  The 
development of nuclear weapons has greatly impacted the international community and 
conflict behavior between states.  Weapons of this caliber had not been seen before and it 
took many years to fully understand the implications of this new technology and the 
destruction it could cause.  Once these weapons of deterrence were introduced into the 
international stage, conflict behavior changed when a nuclear-capable state was involved.  
These weapons also inherently increase the risks associated with all military conflict 
behaviors with the potential of using these weapons.  Specific types of conflict behavior 
are utilized when nuclear weapons are at play.    
Brinkmanship and deterrence are the two main styles of conflict behavior states 
use when nuclear weapons are involved on either or both sides.  Brinkmanship is the act 
of escalating a crisis to demonstrate resolve and intimidate the opposing state into de-
escalating and admitting defeat.  This strategy is generally pursued by nuclear states or 
states with strong conventional military powers.  Deterrence can be pursued directly with 
 
4 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “United States Nuclear Forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 75, no. 3 (May 4, 2019): 122–34, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1606503. 
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the threat of nuclear weapons or indirectly through increasing the risks of using nuclear 
weapons for either side.  Nuclear weapons are weapons of deterrence meaning they are 
meant to deter opponents without actually being used in conflict.  This strategy does not 
require a crisis to be used.   
Many states will choose to pursue a combination of these two strategies 
depending on the specific conflict situation.  A state’s nuclear status plays a large role in 
which and how these strategies of conflict behavior are pursued.  Both nuclear and non-
nuclear states will pursue different strategies when in conflict with a nuclear state.  This 
is due to the differences in resolve and credibility that come with nuclear capabilities.               
Through the analysis of case studies and specific states’ conflict behaviors, I find 
that nuclear weapons do change conflict behavior between states.  In general, the 
possession of nuclear weapons emboldens states to act in ways and pursue strategies that 
a non-nuclear state would avoid.  Nuclear weapons provide an extra level of credibility 
and resolve for the state, allowing for more escalation and boldness in a state’s actions.  
Because of this, many nuclear states will choose to pursue brinkmanship strategies 
against another nuclear state.  It is uncommon for a nuclear state to pursue this same 
strategy against a non-nuclear state due to the difference in capabilities and international 
norms that exist.  A non-nuclear state will engage in avoidance and deterrence strategies 
against a nuclear state in order to pursue its interests without the opportunity for nuclear 
weapons to become involved.  This increases the costs of using nuclear weapons against 
it and therefore lowers the benefits for a nuclear state and prevents the conflict from 
escalating to a nuclear strike.  
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A state’s individual view of nuclear weapons and nuclear doctrine also influence 
what strategies in conflict it will pursue.  There are many different views of nuclear 
weapons in the international community which allow for many different interpretations of 
conflict behavior among states.  If a state views nuclear weapons as the danger that they 
are, it will be more cautious during conflicts to prevent too much escalation and risk of 
these weapons being used.  However, if a state were to view nuclear weapons as 
appropriate to use, it would be less likely to avoid brinkmanship strategies and would 
continue escalation.    
I will use evidence from the Soviet Union’s and China’s interactions with the 
United States during the middle of the Cold War to examine this theory.  I analyzed the 
years between 1950 to 1965 when the Cold War was escalating between the Soviet Union 
and the United States.5  With the Soviet Union having just gained nuclear powers and the 
United States maintaining nuclear superiority in the international community, this decade 
and a half was a time of high and still rising tensions between these two states.  I selected 
these states and this period to demonstrate how two rival nuclear states behave in conflict 
and analyze what strategies each state utilized and why. 
China did not have nuclear weapons until 1964, the end of the analyzed time 
period.6  However, this state interacted in conflict against the United States, a strong 
nuclear power, during 1950-1965 without having its own nuclear weapons.  I selected 
this specific case study to examine the conflict behavior of a non-nuclear state opposing a 
 
5 Paul C. Avey, Tempting Fate: Why Nonnuclear States Confront Nuclear Opponents. (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2019) Ch. 5. 
6 Vipin Narang, “China,” in Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, Regional Powers and International 
Conflict (Princeton University Press, 2014), 121. 
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strong rival and nuclear state.  It is important to analyze the interactions of states during 
the same time period to minimize the potential for changing international climate and 
have comparable situations.  The period of 1950 to 1965 hosted many different conflicts 
between the United States and the rival states of the USSR and China.  Analyzing states 
that both engaged in conflict with the United States prevents differences that could exist 
from states engaging in conflict with different rival states.  The United States represents 
the rival state that either a nuclear or non-nuclear state is opposing and using conflict 
behaviors against. 
The following chapters will explain the theory behind conflict behavior strategies 
and analyze two case studies that will demonstrate the theory in practice.  I will explain 
when and how each type of state will pursue each type of conflict behavior.  The case 
study involving the Soviet Union and the United States will focus on how the Soviet 
Union handled the United States in conflict and utilized its new nuclear capabilities.  
With China lacking nuclear weapons during this time period, the second case study will 
focus on how the United States’ nuclear weapons affected China’s conflict behavior.  
Finally, the concluding chapter will look at how these findings can aid states in 
determining the most effective conflict strategies given the impact of nuclear weapons 
and what this could mean for future conflicts.          
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Chapter 2: Theory  
 
States are constantly interacting with each other in a variety of ways, but their 
behavior changes depending on the interaction.  Occasionally, these interactions turn into 
conflicts as states hold competing interests.  We live in an anarchic world and all states 
have a goal of becoming a hegemonic power.1  Survival and power are the main interests 
of states.  Conflict is one of the many ways to maintain power and can also be a means of 
survival against another powerful state.  Many conflicts can occur over threats to these 
two crucial interests of all states or various other disagreements.   
Within conflict, there are different strategies states can utilize and different 
conflict behaviors that states take part in.  States engage in a combination of diplomatic 
and conflict behaviors, using different strategies based on the situation and the desired 
outcome.  Brinkmanship is a specific type of behavior that occurs when states are 
contemplating going to war, looking to escalate a war, or to avoid war. 
 Brinkmanship is used to demonstrate the resolve of the state.  Any type of 
escalation comes with a large amount of risk in conflict: both states aim to demonstrate as 
much resolve as possible to intimidate the enemy state.  The idea of conflict behavior and 
brinkmanship can be thought of as a poker game where bluffing and misinformation are 
the players’ greatest strengths.  No state has all of the information about its opposition 
during a conflict.  Bluffing and misinformation are methods that help increase the 
potential of a weaker state to win a conflict.  Faking resolve through these strategies 
allows weaker states to appear stronger and benefit more throughout a conflict and in 
 
1 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 54-55, 
http://archive.org/details/tragedyofgreatpo0000mear. 
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potential negotiations.  Brinkmanship is not always meant to go to war and war can be 
initiated accidentally through brinkmanship strategies.2  The art of brinkmanship is to 
push the opponent close to the possibility of war or the escalation of war, in this case to 
the use of nuclear weapons, to have it be forced to de-escalate and give in to the state’s 
demands.   
Brinkmanship creates a shared risk and possibility of escalation for both parties 
unless the threatened side withdraws from the conflict.3  This shared risk acts as a “game 
of chicken” for both states seeing which will act first and accept defeat.  As well, the 
threat of a general war increases if a limited war is already being fought by the two 
states.4  Each step of escalation increases the risk of escalating to the next step, an 
exponential scale of risk as one moves further down the line.  Neither state is in full 
control of the situation once brinkmanship is utilized, not even the state that initiated the 
escalation.  A way to describe this situation is the threatening state is deliberately 
allowing the conflict to get somewhat out of hand.5  The hope is that this risk of 
escalation that is unknown to both parties will be enough for the threatened state to 
withdraw and de-escalate the conflict.6   
If the fighting states do escalate the conflict, that is up to both sides and some 
degree of chance.  Neither side can accurately predict how the other will react to 
escalation.  The options are to give in and de-escalate, to continue to match the resolve of 
 
2 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface, 1980 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
Univ. Press, 20) 189. 
3 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 200-201. 
4 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 190-192. 
5 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 199-200. 
6 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 200. 
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the threatening state, or to take escalation into its own hands before the threatener has a 
chance to control the conflict.  The third option is not a common strategy used by states 
but still a possibility the threatener must take into account.  When threatened by an 
opposing state, some may choose to do a preemptive strike as a way to gain the first 
strike advantage if the state believes war will inevitably result from the escalation.  This 
is a rare occurrence but still a possibility.   
 The second method of conflict behavior is the use of deterrence to prevent a war, 
to begin with.  This is seen with specific states that have nuclear weapons and some states 
with very strong conventional military power.  Deterrence works when one state has a 
weapon or strategy so powerful and dangerous that the opposing state will not attack in 
fear of said weapon or strategy.  Deterrence hangs on the idea of credibility.  If a state is 
not seen as credible in its threat to follow through, the threat will not deter the enemy.   
Nuclear weapons are known as weapons of deterrence.  While conventional 
weapons are meant to be used in combat, weapons of deterrence are intended to deter 
potential enemies and to never actually be used in war.  As Schelling points out, weapons 
of deterrence focus on “ex-ante” prevention rather than “ex-post” revenge.7  Such as 
threatening a child with consequences before he or she acts, deterrence is a threat prior to 
any action, warning enemies of what will happen if they do act.  Deterrence is used to 
prevent action all together instead of retaliation once action occurs.   
Using deterrence in conflict acts as protection and defense.8  These weapons are 
used as warning threats, rather than revenge, to defend the states against conflict.  The 
 
7 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 187. 
8 Robert Powell, “Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense,” 
International Security 27, no. 4 (April 1, 2003): 88-89, https://doi.org/10.1162/016228803321951108. 
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issue of credibility is a large one.  Many states fake resolve and it is difficult to tell which 
states will follow through on their promised consequences.  A way to increase credibility 
is to combine deterrence and brinkmanship and leave the possibility of the threatened use 
of the deterrence weapon up to chance.9  By leaving the possibility of war up to chance 
due to brinkmanship and escalation, many opposing states will choose to withdraw and 
be successfully deterred from further conflict with the other state.  
A state can also increase its credibility by following through on smaller threats 
prior to actually using a weapon of deterrence.  By starting a limited war or escalating a 
limited war to a general war, a state can prove its resolve to its opponents so when a 
deterrence weapon is threatened, the threat is real and credible.10  Deterrence is a serious 
threat of retaliation used to prevent any combat in the first place. 
 Nuclear weapons are weapons of deterrence and greatly impact conflict behavior 
between states.  These are weapons of mass destruction and after the international 
community witnessed the damage they can cause in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are now 
understood as weapons of deterrence rather than weapons for use.  Although these 
weapons are no longer intended for use and the international community knows this, no 
one can be sure that the next conflict will not be the one where a nuclear weapon is used.  
Because of this uncertainty, states must act as if the weapons could be used at any time 
and the nuclear states must be resolved enough to act as if they will use the weapons at 
any time.   
 
9 Powell, "Nuclear Deterrence Theory," 89-91. 
10 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 190-192. 
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When two nuclear states interact in conflict behavior, things become complicated.  
Nuclear-nuclear conflict brings up the idea of mutually assured destruction.  With two 
nuclear states going to war, if one state was to decide to use its nuclear weapons, the 
other would as well.  The conflict would then end in both states’ nuclear destruction.  The 
idea of capabilities matters more than a state’s intentions when it comes to conflict, 
particularly with nuclear weapons involved.  If a state has weapons of any kind, opposing 
states will assume and act as if they could be used.  States will not take the risk of 
debating an enemy’s intentions with its weapons, they will simply look at the capabilities 
and assume they could be utilized at any time.11    
The case studies following this chapter will examine how two nuclear states’ 
behavior interacts in conflict and how a nuclear state and non-nuclear state behave in 
conflict with each other.  These interactions, while having some similarities, are expected 
to be generally different from each other given the differing nuclear capabilities of each 
state involved.  As well, it is not expected that all states will pursue conflict behavior in 
the same way, with or without nuclear weapons.  Each state shares the main interests of 
power and survival but has its own individual interests of the state’s leadership and 
citizens that also influence which strategies are utilized in conflict.  These case studies 
demonstrate how nuclear and non-nuclear rivals of the United States will behave in a 
conflict with Washington.    
I argue that nuclear states pursue stronger brinkmanship strategies compared to 
non-nuclear states when interacting with another nuclear state.  This strategy is dangerous 
 
11 See, for example, United States’ actions in the Cuban Missile Crisis: Vladislav M. Zubok, Failed 
Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2007), 143-149. 
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for a non-nuclear state when in conflict with a nuclear state due to the unequal 
distribution of force.  It is therefore logical to avoid implementing brinkmanship 
strategies in this case.  A nuclear state has the ability to escalate conflicts due to having 
nuclear capabilities that enhance the credibility of its threats.  It is more common for a 
nuclear state to utilize brinkmanship rather than a non-nuclear state when in a conflict 
with any nuclear state, but specifically the United States.12   
However, brinkmanship strategies only go so far and can only account for so 
much in conflict behavior between nuclear states.  Differing doctrines regarding nuclear 
weapons also determine how a state will behave in conflict.  When a state has had nuclear 
weapons for some time and fully understands the costs and destruction of using them 
against an enemy, it is more likely to approach the situation cautiously and attempt to 
avoid nuclear war.  For states with newer nuclear capabilities that lack this full 
understanding, brinkmanship and escalation strategies are more likely to be pursued.  
Depending on how seriously a state views nuclear weapons, that state will be more or less 
likely to pursue brinkmanship and be willing to escalate the conflict to dangerous levels.   
Brinkmanship will be the main tactic in the early days of a new nuclear weapons 
state when interacting with its rival country.  These weapons tend to embolden states due 
to the severity of them and the credibility they hold.  Because of this, brinkmanship is 
generally pursued by new nuclear states in times of conflict with a rival nuclear state.   
There are multiple conditions in which nuclear states would choose to pursue 
brinkmanship.  For one, the conflict must be an immediate crisis rather than a low-stakes 
 
12 See, for example, Russia’s use of brinkmanship against the United States in 1960: Zubok, Failed Empire, 
137-143. 
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encounter.13  The increased stress that a crisis adds to conflict makes brinkmanship a 
more likely strategy.  This pressure increases the possibility of risky decisions and 
mistakes.  Brinkmanship is a risky decision that many nuclear states will make during 
times of crisis.  Escalation adds further stress to the crisis while demonstrating resolve to 
end the situation through any necessary means.  Brinkmanship is a way to force the 
opposing state to end the crisis through intimidation and escalation.   
However, when a nuclear state uses brinkmanship against another nuclear state, 
this intimidation will not work as well, and the opposing nuclear state will most likely 
meet the escalation levels.  Due to both powers having nuclear capabilities, brinkmanship 
falters when the potential for mutually assured destruction is introduced.  With both states 
having balanced escalation capabilities, brinkmanship is not as effective.  Both states are 
aware of the possibility of destruction if nuclear weapons were to be implemented.  This 
becomes a game of which state will break its resolve first and de-escalate the conflict for 
the safety of everyone involved.  
Another condition that encourages nuclear states to use brinkmanship is a conflict 
with a rival state.  When two states have a long-standing history of conflict, whether 
military or diplomatic, it is more likely for one of them to pursue brinkmanship strategies 
in a military conflict against that state.  These repeated interactions create an iterated 
game where past resolve and past actions play a large role in how each state will handle 
the current conflict.  If both states have proven their resolve in the past, brinkmanship 
will be a likely choice of conflict behavior as a way to further push the other state’s 
resolve and hopefully find its breaking point.  Brinkmanship, if pursued successfully, 
 
13 See Cuban Missile Crisis: Zubok, Failed Empire, 143-149. 
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further solidifies the escalating state’s resolve for any future interactions with the same 
state.   
It is rare for a nuclear state to utilize nuclear brinkmanship against a non-nuclear 
state.14  It is possible to use brinkmanship and escalate a conventional conflict with a non-
nuclear state but nuclear weapons act as a deterrent more so than an escalation factor in 
these cases.  Going directly to nuclear brinkmanship when dealing with a non-nuclear 
state demonstrates a lack of understanding of the severity of these weapons and is too 
high of an increase in escalation.  International norms regarding conflict and nuclear 
weapons have determined this is generally unacceptable as nuclear weapons are meant to 
be deterrents and not used.15  This severe escalation of force is unnecessary against a non-
nuclear state and is generally not pursued.  However, this escalation is acceptable against 
another nuclear state due to the balance of force between each side and the potential for 
mutually assured destruction. 
It is not the best practice for a non-nuclear state to use brinkmanship when dealing 
with a nuclear state.  While in a conventional war it is possible to escalate conventional 
tactics, the nuclear state being threatened is aware of its own nuclear capabilities and the 
non-nuclear state’s lack of these abilities.  This escalation by a non-nuclear state against a 
nuclear state is illogical in most scenarios due to this unequal balance of force and the 
resolve of the non-nuclear state lacks the credibility the nuclear weapons state has.   
 
14 See, for example, how the United States interacted with China: Avey, Tempting Fate: Why Nonnuclear 
States Confront Nuclear Opponents. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019) Ch. 4. 
15 Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-
Use,” International Organization 53, no. 3 (1999): 435. 
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Because of this unequal power balance, non-nuclear states are expected to pursue 
avoidance and discouraging strategies against nuclear states.  Many non-nuclear states 
will avoid direct military interaction with a nuclear state during a conflict in order to 
prevent escalating and creating a direct conflict with that state.  If a non-nuclear state 
avoids direct interaction with a nuclear state, it does not make sense to implement nuclear 
weapons against it.  Through this practice, non-nuclear states are discouraging the nuclear 
state from conflict with them by lowering the benefits the potential conflict would have 
for the nuclear state.16  By limiting the benefits of conflict for the nuclear state, the non-
nuclear state discourages the nuclear state from starting a direct conflict.   
It should also be pointed out that a non-nuclear state will not be deterred from a 
conflict with a nuclear state if its interests are strong enough.  The mere existence of 
nuclear weapons in the nuclear state is not enough to deter and prevent a non-nuclear 
state from pursuing its interests of power and survival.  However, these weapons do 
change how a non-nuclear state will pursue its interests and forces the state to proceed 
with stronger levels of caution and apprehension than it would have if these weapons 
were not involved.  Maintaining resolve, even if faked, when dealing with a nuclear state 
is crucial for the success of these avoidant and discouraging strategies.  This avoidance of 
direct conflict makes the use of excessive force or nuclear weapons unacceptable in the 
international community and therefore prevents nuclear states from using this form of 
escalation.  If a non-nuclear state does not directly threaten a nuclear state, it is breaking 
international norms to in turn, threaten or use nuclear weapons against that state.   
 
16 See, for example, China’s actions in the Taiwan Strait Crises: Avey, Tempting Fate, Ch. 4. 
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The conditions in which a non-nuclear state will pursue avoidant and 
discouraging strategies vary but there are some generalities.  A non-nuclear state will use 
these techniques when it is prevented from pursuing its direct interests in a second non-
nuclear state.  This prevention is usually in the form of a nuclear state’s protection of the 
non-nuclear state through a defense pact or allyship.  If the non-nuclear state’s interests in 
that non-nuclear enemy are strong enough, the non-nuclear state will not let the nuclear 
state’s protection of the other state deter it from pursuing these interests.  If the enemy 
nuclear state is protecting the interests of the non-nuclear state and preventing direct 
access, the non-nuclear state will attempt these avoidant strategies.  The state will then 
avoid direct contact with the opposing nuclear state while still attempting to pursue its 
interests in the other non-nuclear state through conflict with that protected state.     
A second general condition for using avoidance and deterrence is the state’s views 
on nuclear weapons and ability to fake resolve.  If a non-nuclear state can portray a lack 
of fear regarding nuclear weapons, a nuclear state is less likely to threaten it.  This faked 
resolve demonstrates that threats of nuclear weapons use will not be successful and 
lowers the benefit to a nuclear state to use this escalation strategy.  With this potential of 
nuclear weapons relatively low, the non-nuclear state has successfully deterred the 
nuclear state from escalating conflict and can simplify pursuing interests from this point.   
This ability to fake resolve is also a strategy of nuclear states.  However, the 
benefits are larger for a non-nuclear state.  A nuclear state has the credibility of nuclear 
power on its side while non-nuclear states lack this sense of security.  Because of this, it 
is more important for non-nuclear states to fake resolve in the face of nuclear weapons 
compared to nuclear states.   
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The following case studies will look at the Soviet Union and China and how these 
states interacted with the United States from 1950 to 1965.  The USSR’s nuclear 
capabilities and doctrine regarding nuclear weapons as a fairly new nuclear state will 
affect how it interacts with the United States, another strong nuclear power.  China’s lack 
of nuclear weapons but strong interests in Taiwan and other territories will affect how it 
handled the United States during this time before it gained nuclear weapons.  The Soviet 
Union is expected to heavily rely on brinkmanship strategies while China is expected to 
practice avoidance and deterrence against the United States.  
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Chapter 3: The Soviet Union and the United States 
 
 This chapter will cover Russian and American interactions during the Cold War 
from 1950 to 1965.  This case study demonstrates how two nuclear states interact during 
conflict with each other.  During the Cold War, the USSR gained nuclear capabilities and 
began building up its nuclear weapons arsenal.  The United States, which had developed 
nuclear weapons at the end of World War II, began developing hydrogen bombs and was 
striving for nuclear superiority over the USSR.1 With Russian conventional military 
power outnumbering the United States, the country had to maintain nuclear superiority in 
order to feel secure and attempt to prevent an actual war from starting.2   
 This case study focuses on USSR-US relations as these two states were some of 
the strongest and first nuclear powers of the international community.  Their actions 
during the Cold War set precedents for nuclear weapons use, or lack of use, and were also 
the focus of many nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear containment laws and treaties.  
The period of 1950 to 1965 focuses on the nuclear arms race the two states competed in 
and also follows the most eventful time of the Cold War in terms of United States and 
USSR relations.  This period also encompasses the USSR first experimenting with its 
brand-new nuclear capabilities and determining its nuclear doctrine regarding them.  The 
United States in this period was focused on further refining its nuclear power and 
maintaining superiority over the USSR.  These two nuclear weapons states provide a 
useful example of how two nuclear states interact during conflict and how nuclear 
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weapons affect a state’s conflict behavior as a whole during recent years after gaining 
nuclear capabilities.   
 
Two Exercises in Brinkmanship 
There was a consistent oscillation between which state had superior nuclear 
strength during the Cold War and both states strived for this position.  By increasing and 
improving their own nuclear capabilities, the United States and USSR escalated the 
possibility of a real conflict and also increased the danger that such a conflict would hold.  
An arms race between states demonstrates resolve to go to war by both sides and leaves 
each state prepared for a very severe war due to the buildup of weapons.  While it can be 
argued that an arms race demonstrates threat credibility and can be used as deterrence, it 
also is a form of showing resolve as a stockpile of weapons can be seen as readiness for 
war.  The arms race also places each state on edge waiting for a conflict to strike which 
can lead to the increased possibility of a preemptive strike in fear of the other state’s 
capabilities; or lead to a real conflict starting from a mistake or miscalculation by either 
side.  
 An example of this stress potentially leading to miscalculations occurred on May 
1, 1960, when the Soviet Union shot down an American U2 spy plane.3  The USSR was 
apprehensive waiting for a potential attack from the United States so when a suspicious 
plane was seen, it was taken down.  This had the possibility of starting a war between the 
two states and while that was not the case, escalation did occur as a result of the incident.  
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The USSR was anxiously anticipating an attack from the United States due to the 
American nuclear arsenal growing nearly 72 times the size from 1949 to 1960 as well as 
its advanced delivery capabilities.4  The Soviet Union was particularly nervous due to the 
rivalry between it and the United States following World War II.  In 1959 and early 1960, 
Nikita Khrushchev, Premier of the Soviet Union, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, President 
of the United States, with the help of the British Prime Minister, had spoken about a 
potential de-escalation of the conflict.  Khrushchev found these talks very promising but 
after the U2 plane incident, by the end of 1960, all prospects for a détente between the 
states were gone.5  This incident represents how easily two states can enter into war 
during an arms race due to heightened tensions and advanced military powers.  The U2 
plane incident did not cause a war but did further the escalation between the Soviet Union 
and the United States.  
If the United States and the Soviet Union had gone to war in 1950, there would 
have been major causalities but would not compare to the devastation if the two had gone 
to war in 1960 after building up such destructive nuclear arsenals.  In 1954, the Soviet 
Union began building bunkers and prepping the country to survive nuclear war 
demonstrating a strong resolve to follow through with the use of such weapons.6  The 
realization that nuclear war could end civilization did not slow the Soviet Union’s 
development of the weapons but led it to begin preparing to survive the potential attacks.  
The United States thought very differently about this potential danger.      
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While both states had nuclear capabilities, they had very different doctrines 
regarding these weapons of mass destruction.  The USSR under the rule of Khrushchev 
sought to beat the United States’ nuclear superiority and used a method of nuclear 
brinkmanship.7  Khrushchev did not act as if he understood the severity of these weapons 
and was consistently pushing for bigger and better nuclear capabilities as a way of 
forcing the United States to back down.  This is a perfect example of brinkmanship as 
this escalation did have a factor that was not in control by the USSR or the United States.  
The USSR’s nuclear brinkmanship strategy reached its most critical point in 
October of 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  In an attempt to protect Cuba from 
American influence and to demonstrate resolve, Khrushchev secretly placed nuclear 
missiles in Cuba and worked with Fidel Castro, Prime Minister of Cuba.8  Even in secret, 
this preparation for war so close to the United States demonstrated readiness and 
commitment to nuclear conflict and Khrushchev planned on announcing the missiles’ 
existences at a later date.9   
When the United States discovered the missiles just miles from its own border, 
John F. Kennedy, the President of the United States, brought the incident to the public 
eye, adding pressure to both sides.10  Once the international community is watching an 
event unfold, there is added pressure to appear resolved to the entire community and to 
follow through on any threats made in the public eye.  This phenomenon is known as 
“hand-tying” as states commit themselves to actions by making the threats public.  The 
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Soviet Union’s attempt at brinkmanship did not have the desired effect of forcing the 
United States to de-escalate.  Instead, the United States continued the escalation by 
bringing the international community’s attention to the issue.   
As a way to increase the nuclear deterrent and prevent the United States from 
trying to invade Cuba, the Soviet Union put four nuclear-armed submarines on the Cuban 
shoreline.11  Once Khrushchev learned that Kennedy was also fearful of nuclear war at 
this time, he continued his faked resolve and left the missiles in Cuba for some time 
longer.12  As a nuclear strike became more likely for the United States to implement, 
Khrushchev backed down and came forward with terms to end the crisis.13  After this 
month of rising tensions and a shared fear of nuclear war, the United States and the 
Soviet Union signed terms agreeing to remove all Soviet nuclear capabilities from Cuba 
and the United States’ nuclear weapons from Turkey.14  This use of brinkmanship 
strategies by the Soviet Union held the most uncertainty and potential for a nuclear war 
between the USSR and the United States during the Cold War.   
Along with an exercise in nuclear brinkmanship, this incident also demonstrates a 
nation making movements in an attempt to appear resolved with no plans of following 
through.  The Soviet Union had kept the nuclear warheads locked miles away from the 
actual missiles and eventually determined they would not be used, but the United States 
saw launch capabilities in Cuba and assumed they were for use rather than appearance.15  
While the Soviet Union was bluffing about launching these weapons into the United 
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States, it was impossible for Kennedy to know that Khrushchev truly wouldn’t use the 
weapons or how Castro’s desire for conflict with the United States would factor into the 
equation.  In these cases, it is safest to assume the threat will be followed through on.  
This demonstrates how much more important capabilities are compared to intentions 
when it comes to military and nuclear power.  
The use of nuclear brinkmanship by the Soviet Union in this situation brought 
both states uncomfortably close to a nuclear war.  Khrushchev was unsure of how the 
United States would react to the Soviet Union building up such a large arsenal of 
weapons in the arms race or placing weapons so close to the border and the United States 
did not know if the Soviet Union would end up truly using its weapons or not.  
Khrushchev intended to intimidate the United States into removing its nuclear weapons 
from Turkey.16  Any mistake in planning or unseen factor could have triggered complete 
nuclear war due to this extreme escalation by Khrushchev.  The USSR also 
misunderstood the idea of brinkmanship and believed there to be a “margin of safety” 
within the strategy as the United States was a democratic nation that would not let a full 
war occur in Khrushchev’s mind.17  Khrushchev viewed Kennedy as a young politician 
who would not be bold enough to use a nuclear device and could be easily intimidated 
into submission.18  There was no guarantee that this was the case and therefore a very 
risky move by Khrushchev to continue to escalate the situation.  Khrushchev assumed 
that Kennedy’s resolve was a bluff and Kennedy assumed that Khrushchev’s resolve was 
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real.  By taking the threat more seriously, Kennedy handled the situation carefully 
compared to the rash escalation that Khrushchev conducted.   
The Cuban Missile Crisis forced the Soviet Union to take arms control 
seriously.19  After seeing how easily and unexpectedly a nuclear war could start, 
Khrushchev came to the decision to end his “New Look” policy and reassess his reliance 
on nuclear brinkmanship.20  In this crisis, both sides witnessed how uncontrollable 
brinkmanship strategies can get and the dangers of the unknown when dealing with such 
powerful weapons and the potential for war.  Khrushchev was worried by how close to 
nuclear war the USSR was with the United States and decided to “back away from the 
brink” and de-escalate the conflict.21   
 
Views on Nuclear Weapons During the Arms Race 
Russia was reckless during the nuclear arms race and acted on the belief that the 
fear of nuclear war disadvantaged the United States more than it did the USSR.  Being a 
democratic state with a young leader, the USSR thought the United States would be more 
reluctant to start a nuclear war than the Soviet Union.  It hoped that its built-up arsenal 
would be enough to deter the United States from going to war even when the United 
States had more nuclear capabilities than it did.22  After the Sputnik missile was launched 
in October of 1957, the United States did fear nuclear war more than the Soviet Union 
and launched itself into a second round of the arms race to regain its nuclear superiority.  
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The Soviet Union’s plan of nuclear brinkmanship was highly unstable but did 
successfully increase fear in the United States.     
The United States took a much more calculated and careful approach to the arms 
race and nuclear weapons as a whole compared to the Soviet Union.  America knew that 
it had nuclear superiority for the majority of the Cold War but also knew that the USSR’s 
conventional military forces outnumbered its own and that a nuclear strike would only 
strengthen Soviet communist beliefs.23  This was an issue for the United States as a key 
foreign policy goal in the Cold War was to contain the spread of Communism.  Having 
the USSR deepen its beliefs following an attack would only impede this goal.  The 
United States’ focus shifted to maintaining nuclear superior forces and ensuring the cost 
of war was too high for the USSR to pay.   
The United States built up its delivery capabilities while maintaining the 
warheads it already had, unlike the Soviet Union who focused entirely on developing new 
weapons without advanced delivery methods.24  As late as 1962, the USSR still had 
extremely limited delivery abilities for its weapons.  While nuclear capabilities are 
important, the weapons themselves make little impact if the state has no way to deliver 
the weapons to their targets.  Therefore, the deterrent factor of these weapons weakens 
without the necessary delivery methods and capacities.  For the deterrent of nuclear 
weapons to be effective, there must be a threat of using these weapons which includes a 
delivery system.  
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The United States also recognized the destructiveness of these weapons long 
before the Soviet Union did.  Having been the only state to ever execute a nuclear strike 
while at war, the United States knew the consequences of utilizing these weapons.  In the 
1950s, the Soviet Union was still new to having nuclear weapons and was confirming its 
new identity as a nuclear state.  While Khrushchev understood the power of nuclear 
weapons, he still implemented them with a sense of recklessness.  Under Eisenhower, the 
United States developed a military policy called the New Look that focused on 
maintaining military strength while balancing the budget.25  However, this plan relied 
heavily on maintaining nuclear superiority over the USSR as the conventional forces 
balance still highly favored the Soviet Union.26  
The New Look policy was an example of the United States taking a careful 
approach to nuclear weapons compared to the Soviet Union.  Its only intention was to 
have slight nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union to deter a real war without 
developing an arsenal that could end all of civilization.  The United States’ strategy was 
to have an arsenal large enough to deter Soviet aggression without having to ever 
implement the use of the weapons.  Arguably, the United States was implementing a 
“containment” strategy to limit how many nuclear weapons existed in the world.27   While 
the United States focused on containment and strategic nuclear superiority, the Soviet 
Union focused on nuclear brinkmanship and the chaos that comes with the inherent loss 
of complete control with this tactic. 
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The differing strategies on nuclear weapons greatly affected each state’s conflict 
behavior during the Cold War time period.  Because the United States treated nuclear 
weapons as the threat to humanity that they are, it was cautious and strategic in its 
conflict behavior and only escalated when needed.  The United States focused on 
deterrence theory and preventing the USSR from attacking in the first place so the 
conflict would not turn into a general war.  The Soviet Union, however, saw nuclear 
weapons as the key to spreading the rest of its communist ideologies and viewed nuclear 
brinkmanship as the best strategy.  A nuclear state has significantly higher credibility in 
the international community than a non-nuclear state due to the strength of the weapons.  
By having nuclear capabilities, the Soviet Union believed it could more easily gain 
influence over other states and create communist regimes within those states.  It believed 
the uncertainty in brinkmanship would scare the United States more than it did the Soviet 
Union and therefore prevent war while the USSR would still be the “winner” of the 
conflict.  While nuclear weapons greatly change how states interact in conflict, this can 
be partially attributed to the difference in philosophy that states have regarding these 
weapons.    
 
Governmental Differences 
The difference in nuclear strategy between the states can also be seen in their 
government structures.  In the United States, the government is separate from the 
military; this is a characteristic of a democratic nation.  The military is run by the 
government and the civilians within the government.  In this structure, the President, a 
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civilian, is the only person to have access to the nuclear launch codes.28  In the event that 
the President is no longer able to launch these weapons when necessary, there is a list 
ordered of who next gets access to the codes and the Secretary of Defense is extremely 
low on this list.29   
On the contrary, the USSR was a communist regime with a large amount of 
overlap between government and military officials.  The Soviet Union also gave three 
people the nuclear codes rather than a singular official.  Two out of these three people 
were high-ranking military officials including the Minister of Defense.30  This 
demonstrates a different view of nuclear weapons compared to the United States as more 
individuals and military officials were granted access to using the weapons.  By giving 
the codes to military officials rather than civilian government officials, it further 
empowers the military to act without government input.  This can lead to impulsive 
decisions militarily and negatively affect ties to other states’ governments.  This does, 
however, increase the credibility of the state as it would be easier to put these weapons 
into use by giving access to military officials and more people in total.   
Taking this even further, the Soviet Union considered implementing a computer 
system in charge of launching its nuclear weapons.31  It was referred to as “the dead 
hand” and would have fully dehumanized the process of a nuclear attack.  The human 
interaction that is required to launch a nuclear weapon is necessary to ensure they are 
only used as a last option.  A computer analyzing code sequences cannot take into 
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account the human and societal factors that would factor into the decision to start a 
nuclear war.  If the dead hand system was implemented, a nuclear war would have been 
more likely due to the nature of the computer system.  This system idea occurred at a 
later date outside of the analyzed time period of 1950 to 1965, however, is still important 
to mention.  While this may seem like the next logical step in weapons technology, there 
is something to be said about maintaining a human aspect to war and the importance of 
this factor.  The Soviet Union would have completely depersonalized the process of 
nuclear war in order to establish even stronger credibility for the use of these weapons.    
 
Nuclear Weapons in the Korean War and Berlin Crisis 
From 1950-1953, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a proxy war 
through Korea.  The Korean War was fought by United States’ troops on the South 
Korean side and Soviet and Chinese troops on the North Korean side.  Through this 
proxy war, the United States and the Soviet Union got to witness the conventional 
military capabilities of the other side and got a glimpse at each other’s conflict behavior 
strategies without directly interacting.  During this time, the United States had a large 
increase in its conventional forces, putting $13 billion into defense spending in a single 
year.32  While the Soviet troops still outnumbered the United States conventionally, the 
Soviet Union took note of this increase in strength and recognized the United States’ 
readiness for war. 
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It is important to note that the United States viewed the Korean War as marking 
the seriousness of the communist threat from the Soviet Union.33  While they did not 
directly engage in war with each other, the United States knew that the Korean War 
signified much more.  The Korean War was the first step towards actual war with the 
Soviet Union and each side got a preview of the conventional force of the other state.  
The United States began to expand its forces and security throughout the world to protect 
states such as Japan and Australia from potential communist influence.34  Aside from 
recognizing the severity of the Soviet threat, the United States fought the Korean War as 
it would any war against an ally by providing conventional troops and military support to 
the South Koreans. 
Both states’ behavior during the Korean War demonstrated an understanding of 
the opposing state’s power while still defending their political ideologies in Korea.  The 
United States saw the conventional strength of Soviet forces and in response, built up its 
troops in hopes of this acting as a deterrent to the Soviet Union.35  The USSR consistently 
avoided any direct conflict with the United States during the Korean War and other 
conflicts recognizing the United States’ nuclear superiority.36  Both sides exhibited 
caution during this conflict as it was the start of the Cold War and both sides were 
attempting to gauge the other’s actions. This was also the first conflict where both the 
United States and USSR opposed each other and had access to their own nuclear 
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weapons.  The Korean War was a form of an indirect temperature check for each state to 
gain insight into the other’s potential for general war. 
Another indirect conflict between the United States and the USSR occurred 
during the Berlin Crisis of 1961.  Post-World War II, Germany was split into East and 
West Germany with the East being controlled by the Soviet Union and the West being 
controlled by the NATO powers.  Germany’s capital, Berlin, was also split into East and 
West and controlled by the same powers, respectively, but located within the East 
German border.  Tensions between the two sides of Berlin and the two sides of Germany 
were already running high when Khrushchev demanded that the NATO powers make 
West Berlin a “free” city within six months or he would give control of all access to West 
Berlin to East Germany.37  The United States, Britain, and France refused to give West 
Berlin up to communist powers as this went against the policy of containment.  The 
United States greatly feared Soviet forces in Western Europe during this time but could 
not give up a state to Communism.38  The Soviet Union feared direct conflict with the 
United States but was committed to maintaining Communism in Eastern Germany.39   
Because of these equal fears yet strong commitments, the Berlin Crisis did not 
involve direct military conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States but did 
involve negotiations and examples of conflict behavior between the two.  The Soviet 
Union hoped this ultimatum and forced escalation of the situation in Berlin would force 
the United States to back down and negotiate with the USSR and abandon all communist 
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containment strategies.40  This was another act of brinkmanship by Khrushchev in an 
attempt to intimidate the United States out of real conflict.  However, the United States 
still had nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union at this time and looked to diplomatic 
negotiations rather than direct military conflict.41  The Soviet Union had hoped that an 
ultimatum would scare the NATO powers into submission due to its growing nuclear 
strength and vast conventional military powers.  Khrushchev did not, however, have 
plans to utilize nuclear weapons during this crisis and hoped his “nuclear bluff” would 
work in his favor.42  The threat of using nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union was 
implied and not a direct threat.  NATO was aware of this implied threat due to the 
ultimatum given by the Soviet Union and the large arsenal that had been built under 
Khrushchev’s leadership.   
The Soviet Union relied heavily on bold brinkmanship moves during the Cold 
War in an attempt to force the United States into de-escalation.  Its nuclear brinkmanship 
strategies reflected its different view of nuclear weapons and can explain why it relied so 
heavily on escalation.  Deterrence was more of an afterthought for Khrushchev and the 
Soviet Union as he viewed all weapons as “strategic deterrence” rather than 
distinguishing the deterrence capabilities of nuclear weapons specifically.43  This failure 
to view nuclear weapons as specific weapons of deterrence limited the Soviet Union’s 
conflict behavior strategies as it could have utilized these weapons in different ways 
instead of only using escalation. 
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The following chapter will examine similar conflict behavior strategies through 
China and United States interactions during the same period of 1950 to 1965.  This time 
period is before the Chinese gained nuclear capabilities. 
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Chapter 3: China and the United States 
 
 This chapter will analyze interactions between the United States and China in the 
same time period as the previous chapter of 1950 to 1965.  This chapter represents how a 
nuclear and non-nuclear state interact during conflict.  In 1950, the United States was a 
well-established nuclear state entering the Cold War with the Soviet Union.  China only 
tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, the very end of the examined time period.1  From 
the 1950 to 1965 time period, China did not have nuclear weapons until the end and its 
actions as a non-nuclear state when dealing with the United States, a nuclear weapons 
state, differ from how the Soviet Union, another nuclear state, handled the United States.   
 Mao Zedong declared the formation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 
and became the Chairman of the state, right before the examined time period.2  As a state 
with a newfound communist identity, China would now have to focus on maintaining 
security and establishing itself as a communist state in the international community.  
China’s largest focus was on maintaining Chinese control of its territories such as Taiwan 
and Hong Kong.3  These strong interests influenced how Mao chose to deal with various 
conflicts in this time period. 
It is important to note that as these two case studies are being examined in the 
same time period, the United States was interacting with both the Soviet Union and China 
simultaneously.  While China was not directly a part of the Cold War, it was very active 
during this time and worked with the Soviet Union in a few instances.  There is a fair 
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amount of overlap in interaction and some conflicts also involved all three states such as 
the Korean War.  Even with this overlap, all three states’ conflict behavior changed 
depending on the situation and which states were involved. 
China shared views of concern with the Soviet Union regarding the nuclear power 
of the United States.  Being a non-nuclear state, China was especially careful to avoid 
direct interaction with the United States whenever possible.4  This can be seen in China’s 
behavior in the Korean War.  China, like the Soviet Union, fought alongside the North 
Koreans, against the United States.  However, Chinese troops were very cautious to not 
directly fight United States’ troops and to not threaten the United States outside of the 
context of the Korean War, physically and metaphorically.5  The United States had the 
strongest nuclear arsenal in 1950 and the Chinese took that power seriously.  The nuclear 
power of the United States dictated Chinese behavior during these conflicts.  
Mao feared a unified Korea under United States control rather than only South 
Korea under Washington control which influenced China’s actions during this conflict.6  
Because of this, China was not involved in the Korean War until after Inchon where the 
United States’ troops officially crossed the 38th parallel in June of 1950.7  China was 
hoping to avoid entering into a conflict with the United States but needed to protect 
against a unified Korea that could later pose a threat to its territories.  Throughout the 
Korean War, China maintained its avoidance strategies with the United States’ troops in 
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the hopes this would prevent a general war between the two.  Whether or not the United 
States noticed this avoidance is unclear, but a general war was avoided. 
The United States did not view China as a direct threat.  Washington was only 
concerned with China if a general war occurred in which the Soviet Union joined forces 
with it against the United States.8  Both states did not want a general war between each 
other which influenced both states’ conflict behavior.  China was careful to avoid direct 
contact with the United States and Washington kept its troops to the Korean peninsula 
during the conflict.  Neither side used brinkmanship strategies against each other during 
the war as an additional method of avoidance and threat reduction. 
However, deterrence played a large role for both the United States and China 
during the Korean War.  China recognized the strength of the United States’ nuclear 
power and was not prepared to enter into a nuclear war having no nuclear weapons of its 
own.  The United States’ nuclear arsenal worked as a successful deterrent against a 
potential direct Chinese threat.9  While deterring the Chinese from a larger conflict with 
the United States, America was also successfully deterred from a direct conflict at the 
thought of the Soviet Union aiding the Chinese.10  The Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal 
and conventional military strength were enough to deter the United States from conflict 
with China knowing the USSR would join forces with it and create a large and powerful 
enemy. 
This is indirect deterrence on China’s part as China’s potential alliance was the 
deterrent rather than something the state did or a weapon the state had.  The United States 
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was strong enough to deal with the Soviet Union and China simultaneously but not as a 
single unified force.  The United States did everything in its power to avoid a nuclear war 
which would be more possible to occur if China aligned with the Soviet Union in a 
conflict against Washington.   If the Soviet Union were to join forces with Mao, the 
potential for nuclear weapons use would rise as the Soviet Union was already a growing 
nuclear power.  While the Soviet Union also looked to avoid nuclear war, the possibility 
of this would rise in this scenario as a nuclear strike against the United States by China 
was not possible, unlike by the Soviet Union.  The USSR’s help would increase this 
possibility but not ensure it.  Because of this, China did not have to directly deter the 
United States so long as its interactions with the Soviet Union suggested Soviet nuclear 
support would be given in the event of conflict with the United States. 
In regard to brinkmanship, the Chinese specifically avoided this strategy.  
Following the Korean War, China took steps to prevent any further escalation with the 
United States.11  Even with the potential support from the Soviet Union, China could not 
survive a nuclear attack from the United States and began to prepare for one.12  Mao had 
all machinery and raw materials moved deeper into the country and away from the 
coastlines along with creating defenses on the front lines and anti-atom shelters.13  China 
hoped that these protections would increase the cost of escalation and nuclear war for the 
United States and aid in deterring the state. 14  
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It is also important to note that the Soviet Union was hesitant to provide nuclear 
support to Mao so this aid was only a potential rather than a guarantee.15  This 
uncertainty further deterred China from going to war with the United States as without 
support from the USSR, there was no likelihood of success.  The United States did not 
know about this uncertainty and acted as if the support was guaranteed and continued its 
strategy of avoiding conflict with China.16  This risk was not one the United States was 
willing to take.  While China did not directly fake resolve in this situation, the end result 
had a very similar effect of deterring the United States based on a potentially false 
assumption. 
China had an interesting view of nuclear weapons as a whole.  Mao referred to 
these weapons as “paper tigers” and suggested that they were only as powerful as one is 
afraid of them.17  However, it is very logical to fear weapons of mass destruction.  The 
paper tiger theory goes along with the idea of faking resolve in order to deter an enemy 
state which was a main strategy of China.  By pretending to be less fearful of nuclear 
weapons, one takes away another state’s power to threaten it.  True feelings regarding 
these weapons don’t matter in the paper tiger theory as long as resolve is what is shown 
to the international community and enemy states.    
Mao consistently attempted to raise the costs of nuclear war for the United States 
in any way possible while not having his own nuclear capabilities as a deterrent.18  It is 
difficult to say how much the increased costs of nuclear war affected the United States’ 
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refusal to escalate compared to the state’s own aversion to nuclear conflict.  The United 
States recognized the dangers of these weapons and believed in using them as deterrents 
rather than actually using them.  Because of this, the United States was very unlikely to 
start a nuclear war regardless of Mao’s faked resolve and raised costs.   
This can also be attributed to the differing views of nuclear power.  In general, 
states such as the United States which have had nuclear weapons longer took the power 
of nuclear weapons more seriously than states such as the Soviet Union and China.19  
This can be seen in the handling of nuclear weapons by each type of state.  The United 
States was very cautious and strict about who had access to nuclear weapons and its 
actions demonstrated a deep understanding of their severity.  This leads older nuclear 
states to be more averse to starting a nuclear war than newer nuclear states.   
With more access to nuclear weapons, there is an increased likelihood of their use 
due to more people having the ability to make this decision.  Having less access to 
nuclear weapons in the government demonstrates this aversion to using these weapons by 
limiting the number of people who can make this decision and have this authority.  The 
new nuclear states were less cautious regarding access and continued with brinkmanship 
strategies in the face of potential nuclear retaliation.  Because China lacked nuclear 
weapons at this time, it is impossible to know if it would have been as bold in 
brinkmanship strategies as the Soviet Union was but it is likely that its strategies would 
have differed had it had nuclear capabilities when dealing with the United States.  The 
new access to nuclear weapons tends to embolden new nuclear states more so than 
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conventional weapons leading to differing conflict behaviors and strategies if these 
capabilities are available for use by the state.     
Both of the Taiwan Strait Crises are an example of indirect conflict between 
China and the United States.  Mao wanted to gain control of Taiwan and prevent an 
independent Taiwan.20  Maintaining and acquiring territories was a serious motivation for 
China’s actions throughout the Cold War period.  In 1954 and 1958 when the United 
States openly supported an independent Taiwan over Mao’s leadership, China had to take 
action to prevent even deeper ties between the two states.21  Mao planned to pressure the 
United States out of a potential defense pact with the nationalist government of Taiwan in 
1954.22   
The strategies used to attempt to pressure and deter the United States were a series 
of public warning announcements followed by attacks against smaller islands between 
Taiwan and the Chinese mainland over two months.23  Unfortunately for Mao, the United 
States still went ahead and signed a treaty with Taiwan in December of 1954.24  The 
Chinese decided to escalate the situation after this and publicly announced viewing this 
treaty as an act of aggression and in January 1955, captured the island of Yijiangshan as a 
way of testing how far the defense pact would go.25  This was a bold move of escalation 
on China’s part.  China had avoided all attempts at brinkmanship strategies prior to this 
crisis.  While Mao’s forces only directly interacted with Taiwanese troops and not the 
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United States, the existence of the defense pact made this act one against the United 
States as well.  The United States, not eager to start a nuclear war with the Soviet Union 
through a conflict with China, evacuated all Taiwanese troops from the outside islands.  
China continued to occupy these islands and the American government began to threaten 
military action.26  In April of 1955, the crisis came to an end when Chinese leadership 
requested to negotiate with the United States.27 
It seems odd to escalate a conflict just to turn around and negotiate on China’s 
part, however, there was a strategic purpose to China’s actions during the first Taiwan 
Strait Crisis.  By forcing escalation in this situation, China was able to test how far the 
United States would go to defend Taiwan and how seriously it took the defense pact.  
This was a relatively safe way to do this as the United States’ troops were not harmed by 
the Chinese attacks and direct confrontation between the two was still avoided.  There is 
a degree of uncertainty and danger from this brinkmanship escalation strategy, however, 
as soon as the United States began to threaten further escalation, China backed down and 
recognized the conflict needed to come to a close.  China also gained vital information 
from this crisis.  Mao saw that the United States would not immediately resort to nuclear 
force in a conflict and also avoided direct military interaction with China.  The United 
States had sent nuclear weapons to Taiwan in 1958 which demonstrated resolve; 
however, Washington never directly threatened their use against China.28 
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In August of 1958, the second Taiwan Strait Crisis took place, again with China 
as the aggressor.29  China began dropping shells on the islands of Jinmen and Mazu for 
two months and only ended when it began negotiating with the United States in 
September.30  Eventually, China decided to focus on taking Taiwan from the nationalist 
government and ended all shell attacks in 1979.31  This was a second attempt at testing 
the United States’ commitment to the defense pact with Taiwan as well as demonstrating 
strong resolve to the rest of the international community.32  The fear of permanently 
losing Taiwan motivated Mao to attempt again at gaining control of the island.   
In this second crisis, China did not hesitate to begin with accelerated military 
intervention and decided to shell the islands rather than occupy them.  This was a more 
dangerous move than the actions taken in 1954 by China as it had more casualties and 
was a larger and more serious military endeavor.33  As pointed out in deterrence theory, if 
the motives for a state to act are high enough, the benefits of action could outweigh the 
high costs of the potential for nuclear use.34  This was the case with China and the 
Taiwan Strait.  While the United States’ deterrence did not completely fail, China chose a 
calculated action that would enable it to pursue its interests and raise the costs of a 
nuclear strike for Washington.  China demonstrated the ability of a non-nuclear state to 
enter into conflict with a nuclear power without involving the potential for a nuclear 
strike.   
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China acted while the United States still had power in the Taiwan Strait 
demonstrating the strength of its interest in controlling Taiwan.  It is possible that the 
United States’ failure to respond militarily, aside from threats, in the first Taiwan Strait 
Crisis emboldened the Chinese to act even more aggressively to test the waters of the 
United States’ resolve.  Had the United States taken a more assertive approach in the first 
crisis in 1954, China may not have been brave enough to test the defense pact a second 
time.  The United States took a relatively lenient stance during the 1954 crisis and 
therefore damaged its credibility to retaliate against China and motivated Mao to attempt 
again. 
The United States’ desire to prevent Chinese control of Taiwan and China’s 
perception of this interest were also determinants of this crisis’ outcome.  America had a 
strong containment policy against all communist states and aimed to prevent the spread 
of the ideology and eradicate it if possible.  This containment policy inherently included 
protecting Taiwan from communist Chinese influence, however, the lengths to which the 
United States would go to accomplish this was unknown to China.35  Mao recognized the 
strength of the United States’ military and nuclear forces but questioned Washington’s 
dedication to protecting Taiwan.36  This uncertainty helped motivate the Chinese for the 
first attack on Taiwan to test the Unites States’ resolve.  The United States’ actions in 
1954 proved to China that the United States was not as resolute as it appeared to be and 
allowed China to make another attempt to seize Taiwan in 1958. 
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Nuclear weapons played a large role in Chinese decision making during the 
Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954 and 1958.  Mao took the American nuclear capacity into 
account during all decisions in order to determine which strategy would allow China to 
pursue its interests without Washington choosing to involve nuclear weapons.37  China’s 
main tactic when dealing with the United States was to pretend as if nuclear weapons 
were not a threat, continuing the paper tiger theory.38  Mao’s logic behind this was that if 
the United States may attack anyways, fear would do nothing to help China prepare and 
not be helpful in the potential negotiating process.39  China was aware of its status as a 
non-nuclear state and that having nuclear weapons may encourage the United States to 
attempt intimidation tactics through nuclear threats against China.  Mao knew the 
strategies being attempted by the United States and factored these approaches into 
China’s planning.40  Because of this, Chinese forces continued to avoid direct contact 
with American troops in both Taiwan Strait Crises and created limited dangers directly to 
the United States.41   
By limiting the danger created for the United States, China created very low 
benefits for the use of nuclear weapons to the United States as the threats were minimal.42  
The United States had no reason to implement nuclear force against China as there was 
no direct danger to it, only to Taiwan.  Escalating the crisis to the use of nuclear power 
would have been very unnecessary for the United States and set the wrong precedent for 
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how nuclear weapons should be used.  This precedent would have made it socially 
acceptable to utilize nuclear forces in almost any conflict where military action is already 
involved.  China was a non-nuclear state that had no manner of retaliation against a 
nuclear force and did not use any military force against United States’ troops, making 
nuclear weapons use especially unfit for this situation. 
This nuclear taboo is the international social norm in which nuclear weapons have 
largely negative connotations, more so than conventional weapons, and their use is 
widely looked down upon.43  The non-use of nuclear weapons globally and why the 
United States did not turn to their use in the Taiwan Strait Crises can be attributed to this 
phenomenon and attitude surrounding these weapons.44  With the United States having 
previously enacted two nuclear strikes in Hiroshima and Nagasaki prior to this time 
period, Washington helped create this taboo that exists around nuclear weapons use.45  
The international view of nuclear weapons played a role in the decision whether or not to 
go against the nuclear taboo.  In this situation, this factor greatly influenced the United 
States’ decision to avoid a nuclear strike against China.    
Preventing the United States from being logically and socially allowed to use 
nuclear weapons against China was Mao’s plan for the two conflicts in Taiwan by 
creating limited risk to the United States.  These conflicts and the Korean War motivated 
China to begin its own nuclear program as a deterrent against other nuclear states and 
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their “nuclear blackmail.”46  Mao sought to equalize any future conflicts with the United 
States and potentially the USSR by acquiring China’s own nuclear weapons and 
removing the ability of nuclear threats to be successful.  The Chinese nuclear program 
began in 1955 with the first nuclear test occurring in October of 1964.47  In 1965, China 
tested a second device from a Hong-6 bomber plane which demonstrated the state’s 
delivery capabilities to the international community.48  The conflicts with the United 
States throughout the 1950s motivated Mao to begin the Chinese nuclear program and 
secure China’s role as a nuclear state. 
While Mao had explained nuclear weapons as paper tigers, he still understood the 
immense power these weapons hold in negotiations and conflicts.  The credibility that 
comes with having nuclear capabilities was also recognized by China as seen in how it 
handled the United States in these many conflicts.  Even though Mao faked resolve to the 
international community and limited the impact nuclear threats had, he knew China 
would benefit in the long term if it had these capabilities.  Mao thought of nuclear 
weapons as less powerful than some states portrayed, however, they still had power 
through the rhetoric used and attitudes regarding them in the international community.    
Unlike the Soviet Union, China focused on deterrent and avoidance tactics rather 
than full acts of brinkmanship when dealing with the United States and its nuclear 
capabilities.  This was a safer strategy for China as it was a non-nuclear state dealing with 
one of the strongest nuclear powers during this time period.  Mao acted very cautiously 
when interacting with the United States but did not allow the state’s nuclear weapons 
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capacity to intimidate China out of pursuing its interests in Korea and Taiwan.  This was 
the most practical route to take for a non-nuclear state against such a powerful adversary.  
China maintained resolve throughout these conflicts, not allowing the United States to 
coerce it, and still understood the severity of nuclear weapons and considered their 
implications in each situation.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 A state’s decision to enter into conflict and subsequent choice of conflict behavior 
is very nuanced and complex.  Each individual interest of the state behind the main 
interests of power and survival helps motivate these specific decisions.  A deep 
understanding of how and why these decisions are made allows states to combat their 
rivals in more efficient and potentially successful ways.  While misinformation and 
bluffing are common strategies in conflict, more information about an enemy will only 
aid a state in conflict.  
 Nuclear weapons add another layer of nuance to these already intricate choices.  
Nuclear states have inherently stronger credibility than non-nuclear states due to this 
powerful advantage which allows these states to engage in different types of conflict 
behavior than non-nuclear states.  Brinkmanship is a common tactic for nuclear states to 
use when engaging with other nuclear states due to the balanced power distribution 
between the two.  This escalation strategy carries a significant risk that nuclear states can 
generally afford due to their inherent credibility and resolve compared to non-nuclear 
states that must fake this resolve in the face of a nuclear combatant.       
The United States as a democratic nation with a vast understanding of the 
repercussions of nuclear weapons was very reluctant to engage in nuclear brinkmanship 
with the Soviet Union and China.  Compare this to how Khrushchev continued to escalate 
the Soviet Union’s strategies closer and closer to the brink of nuclear war.  As a 
communist nation with limited input from its citizens, the Soviet Union was able to make 
these aggressive military moves and solely pursue power and status in the international 
community.  China, on the other hand, was also reluctant to start a nuclear war due to its 
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non-nuclear status compared to the United States’ nuclear superiority.  It chose to 
practice avoidance and deterrence strategies in order to pursue its interests without 
allowing the United States to start nuclear interventions. 
Each state pursued the conflict behavior most appropriate for the situation given 
its own nuclear status, the specific situation, the enemy, and its individual identity.  The 
Soviet Union, a nuclear state, combating its rival nuclear state in a crisis pursued 
brinkmanship to demonstrate its strength and new nuclear powers.  While risky, this was 
the most logical decision for the Soviet Union in this situation, because it demonstrated 
its new nuclear abilities and tested the United States resolve while preventing a nuclear 
war.  China, a non-nuclear state, chose to avoid direct conflict with the United States, a 
strong nuclear power, while still pursuing its individual interests and protecting its 
communist identity.  These conflict behavior choices accurately fit the scenario at hand 
for each state.   
While not every state will adhere to this theory regarding conflict behavior and 
nuclear weapons, this can be seen as the norm when states attempt to discern their 
enemy’s choices.  Each state’s individual identities play a role in this decision as well, 
making each state behave differently according to its identity.  Understanding three states 
out of the entire international community does not provide an explanation for every other 
state’s behavior.  However, patterns can be observed and help explain and be 
extrapolated to other states with similar identities and nuclear status.  In any case, this 
theory demonstrates how significantly nuclear weapons status plays a role in determining 
conflict behavior between rival states and reveals patterns that can be further generalized 
to other similar states and situations.            
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The United States can use this theory today and in future conflicts to predict the 
potential conflict behavior of enemy states.  In applying this theory, the United States can 
also be aware of how its own actions affect and change behavior in opposing states.  As 
an older nuclear power, the United States is secure in its nuclear doctrine and identity and 
has a history of avoiding nuclear conflict, excluding Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  This 
demonstrates how older nuclear states rely on deterrence strategies as opposed to 
brinkmanship or nuclear interventions.  Knowing that opposing states observe this 
pattern, the United States can take into account how its deterrence strategies will impact a 
rival state in conflict.  The United States can also potentially purposely change its conflict 
behavior to remove a sense of familiarity in the situation for the enemy state in order to 
have a larger chance of success.  Knowledge of this theory can aid the United States in 
conflict by providing insights into the enemy’s potential behavior and how its own 
conflict behavior can be adjusted for further success.    
Newer nuclear powers, such as the Soviet Union in the 1950s-60s, tend to be 
bolder and rasher in their actions due to this newfound resolve and credibility in conflict.  
This is important for the United States and other opposing states to consider when 
engaging in conflict with these new nuclear states.  The lack of a secure nuclear doctrine 
provides opportunities for experimentation with different types of nuclear conflict 
behavior.  Because of this, the conflict behavior of these states is harder to predict.  
However, this theory demonstrates a heavy reliance on nuclear brinkmanship by these 
types of states.  This is also due to the increased resolve nuclear weapons give states and 
the bold actions that follow it.  If in the future a rival state of the United States gains 
nuclear weapons capabilities, the United States should expect strong brinkmanship 
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strategies to be used by this new nuclear state and must consider this when entering into 
conflict.       
Non-nuclear states that engage in conflict with the United States do not have to 
fear direct nuclear threats when engaging in avoidance and other deterrent strategies due 
to international norms.  The United States is best off pursuing deterrence strategies with 
non-nuclear and other older nuclear states.  This strategy has proven successful with little 
cost or damage to Washington.  It is possible that non-nuclear states using this theory 
may become bolder knowing direct nuclear threats are not likely, but this is questionable 
due to the uncertainty that exists surrounding nuclear weapons use.  So long as the United 
States remains resolved in conflict with non-nuclear states, the potential for nuclear use 
will always exist and be enough to deter most non-nuclear states from direct escalated 
conflict with the United States.     
Conflict today, nuclear or not, is changing.  With technology advancing further in 
today’s world, the United States and other nuclear powers need to be cautious to avoid 
turning to an autonomous nuclear weapons system, similar to the dead hand system 
proposed by the Soviet Union.  The human aspect that nuclear weapons require is key to 
ensuring that these weapons remain weapons of deterrence and do not become common 
use against all types of enemies.  What gives nuclear weapons their power in conflict is 
the credibility and deterrent abilities inherent in these weapons.  If these weapons were to 
become commonly used due to an autonomous system, not only would civilization likely 
drastically change, but these weapons would lose their uniqueness and ability to prevent 
certain conflicts altogether.  While these weapons would still maintain their destructive 
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power, they would no longer be weapons of deterrence or a last resort for states, 
diminishing the power of deterrence theory.  
Nuclear weapons status is a significant factor in determining conflict behavior due 
to the weapons’ distinctive characteristics of deterrence and credibility compared to 
conventional weapons.  This status determines what strategies make the most sense for a 
state to pursue during a conflict and how a state will approach an enemy state depending 
on nuclear status.  While some states may not adhere to this theory, this can be useful for 
any state entering into conflict in today’s world to understand the many implications 
nuclear status has on conflict behavior between states.       
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